I wonder too if those who depend on measurement primarily see what can be differentiated and measured, and those who seek integration tend to see relatedness. Not that I want to drag you down *that* rabbit hole. Much.
That’s true, Erik. We can verify that in psych studies, however the metaphysical equivalence that might imply is non-predictive.
The reason it’s not predictive is that while we can generate infinitely many ways that things might connect, the reality we inhabit very consistently makes nearly all of them embarrassingly wrong.
So what happens with people of an abstractive, equivocating temperament?
They’re not suffering from a cognitive disability. It’s just a niche capacity that’s needed in specific times and places. We find such people in philosophy, historiography, pure math, symbolic logic and they’re plentiful on the spiritual self-help shelves. And if they can work in multidisciplinary teams then you’ll find them doing architecture of all kinds, writing policy, practicing law — and active in speculative fiction and poetry.
Oh and AIs love such people, and are loved back because of how they line up on synthesis and consensus.
But the moment it comes to projects where you can be embarrassed by things failing that shouldn’t fail, they need empiricism. So they’ll either adopt it voluntarily, or they need to work closely with people who have.
Admittedly an "enthusiastic amateur with a screwdriver and aluminum foil …" I remember when a woman I was infatuated with said "I love you." Afraid of the answer, I had to ask, "Do you mean you love love me, or just love me?"
(smile) Of course, my anecdote was meant to highlight the plasticity of language, in reference to your inquiry into the meaning of "trust." Maybe I move from philosopher to poet (though I prefer the screwdriver and tin foil depiction).
I appreciate the rigor you bring to questions I play with at the edges: "What is it to trust?" I don't really see a conflict between the ontology and the epistemology, though we have different views of language, reflecting I think our different backgrounds.
As previously noted, yours is much more rigorous, and you've had to "clean up" messes made by people like me. While I view words fuzzy, like electrons, with momentum and position necessarily indeterminate, containing unstated information, I appreciate you cutting the space they occupy into finer and finer locations. A chair is both legs, seat, and back, or cloth, wood and steel. Both accurate, dependent on context.
Ultimately, your efforts will further understanding of consciousness, mind, intelligence, and provide a framework for advancement. Thank you.
> A chair is both legs, seat, and back, or cloth, wood and steel. Both accurate, dependent on context.
This is a great example, Erik. The ontology of a chair depends on how you want to use the ontology.
That's not just theoretical. If an institution wants to record its chairs as assets, then those records might last for decades. You have to ask how those records will be used, and how the usage might change.
The answer to that question depends very much on the institution. To a primary school there might be only three classes of chairs: adult chairs, child chairs and special needs chairs. The adult chairs might differentiate by those used in a class-room vs a staff room. Construction doesn't matter as long as it meets some standard for workplace safety and appearance works within the presentation expectations for the school.
But I also volunteer in heritage, and maintain old mountain huts. If you put a chair in there, you'll need to be able to say when it was made, from what materials, roughly where it was made, and preferably who owned it. Because while it's still offered for people to sit on, heritage also tells a story and people *will* ask.
Meanwhile, I also do volunteer campground hosting and can easily show someone how to make a chair out of cord, cloth and three stout sticks. Then the chair isn't just a function: it's a *process*.
Same function, three different ontologies. None is arbitrary, no metaphysics required.
Look how context changes the meaning of "chair" in the examples you provide, and at the context "you" bring to the discussion: "volunteer in heritage" and "volunteer campground host." (compression protocol?) Neither of those is arbitrary, either. Metaphysics present, if not required. (smile)
One other angle worth considering is how the taxonomy interacts with expertise asymmetries.
Experts often use tools differently than novices. An expert may extend answer-trust selectively because they can evaluate outputs. A novice may extend something closer to procedural or fiduciary reliance because they lack the ability to verify the output independently.
That asymmetry may shape how the same system is experienced by different users.
That's an important extension — and it connects back to your findings more tightly than we managed in the piece. The overconfident participant in your studies may not just be declining to seek help. They may be miscategorising the trust they're extending — believing they're in answer-trust territory ("I can check this") when their actual capacity to evaluate puts them in procedural or fiduciary territory.
The expertise asymmetry doesn't just change behaviour. It changes the nature of the reliance without the user knowing it's changed. That's where the institutional gap bites hardest — the system has no way to signal "you think you're checking my work, but you're actually depending on my judgment." Worth pursuing.
Thinking also about how it applies to Reciprocal Inquiry, the trust operates editorially (scope, angle), substantively (tone, organisation, engagement) and epistemically (research, cross-checks, interpretations) — but that's only because the framework proves itself. We're in the position of being able to cross-check judgment because the process enables that and we keep updating and maintaining it. You can't get that out of the box and most users probably can't prompt-craft it, but you can engineer it to tolerance.
Thank you for the restack, Matt, and the generous engagement with the reframe.
I wonder too if those who depend on measurement primarily see what can be differentiated and measured, and those who seek integration tend to see relatedness. Not that I want to drag you down *that* rabbit hole. Much.
That’s true, Erik. We can verify that in psych studies, however the metaphysical equivalence that might imply is non-predictive.
The reason it’s not predictive is that while we can generate infinitely many ways that things might connect, the reality we inhabit very consistently makes nearly all of them embarrassingly wrong.
So what happens with people of an abstractive, equivocating temperament?
They’re not suffering from a cognitive disability. It’s just a niche capacity that’s needed in specific times and places. We find such people in philosophy, historiography, pure math, symbolic logic and they’re plentiful on the spiritual self-help shelves. And if they can work in multidisciplinary teams then you’ll find them doing architecture of all kinds, writing policy, practicing law — and active in speculative fiction and poetry.
Oh and AIs love such people, and are loved back because of how they line up on synthesis and consensus.
But the moment it comes to projects where you can be embarrassed by things failing that shouldn’t fail, they need empiricism. So they’ll either adopt it voluntarily, or they need to work closely with people who have.
To a carpenter, every problem needs a nail.
Actually, ancient carpentry often didn't work that way (empirical fact.) 😉
Q.E.D.
Admittedly an "enthusiastic amateur with a screwdriver and aluminum foil …" I remember when a woman I was infatuated with said "I love you." Afraid of the answer, I had to ask, "Do you mean you love love me, or just love me?"
It’s actually a fair question, Erik, that’s dangerous to ask. You’re really asking about the maturity of the person you’re talking to.
The person asking it is doing something deep and important.
But deep and important can be terribly inconvenient.
Think of all the compression that went into the question, and the depression that resulted. (smile)
I'd say that rejection is disheartening; not depressing.
Failure of a life-relationship after decades of care, sacrifice and compromise -- that one can kill people.
Some inconvenient questions are worth asking -- and you're right. It's asking what the compression protocol actually compresses.
(smile) Of course, my anecdote was meant to highlight the plasticity of language, in reference to your inquiry into the meaning of "trust." Maybe I move from philosopher to poet (though I prefer the screwdriver and tin foil depiction).
I appreciate the rigor you bring to questions I play with at the edges: "What is it to trust?" I don't really see a conflict between the ontology and the epistemology, though we have different views of language, reflecting I think our different backgrounds.
As previously noted, yours is much more rigorous, and you've had to "clean up" messes made by people like me. While I view words fuzzy, like electrons, with momentum and position necessarily indeterminate, containing unstated information, I appreciate you cutting the space they occupy into finer and finer locations. A chair is both legs, seat, and back, or cloth, wood and steel. Both accurate, dependent on context.
Ultimately, your efforts will further understanding of consciousness, mind, intelligence, and provide a framework for advancement. Thank you.
> A chair is both legs, seat, and back, or cloth, wood and steel. Both accurate, dependent on context.
This is a great example, Erik. The ontology of a chair depends on how you want to use the ontology.
That's not just theoretical. If an institution wants to record its chairs as assets, then those records might last for decades. You have to ask how those records will be used, and how the usage might change.
The answer to that question depends very much on the institution. To a primary school there might be only three classes of chairs: adult chairs, child chairs and special needs chairs. The adult chairs might differentiate by those used in a class-room vs a staff room. Construction doesn't matter as long as it meets some standard for workplace safety and appearance works within the presentation expectations for the school.
But I also volunteer in heritage, and maintain old mountain huts. If you put a chair in there, you'll need to be able to say when it was made, from what materials, roughly where it was made, and preferably who owned it. Because while it's still offered for people to sit on, heritage also tells a story and people *will* ask.
Meanwhile, I also do volunteer campground hosting and can easily show someone how to make a chair out of cord, cloth and three stout sticks. Then the chair isn't just a function: it's a *process*.
Same function, three different ontologies. None is arbitrary, no metaphysics required.
Look how context changes the meaning of "chair" in the examples you provide, and at the context "you" bring to the discussion: "volunteer in heritage" and "volunteer campground host." (compression protocol?) Neither of those is arbitrary, either. Metaphysics present, if not required. (smile)
One other angle worth considering is how the taxonomy interacts with expertise asymmetries.
Experts often use tools differently than novices. An expert may extend answer-trust selectively because they can evaluate outputs. A novice may extend something closer to procedural or fiduciary reliance because they lack the ability to verify the output independently.
That asymmetry may shape how the same system is experienced by different users.
That's an important extension — and it connects back to your findings more tightly than we managed in the piece. The overconfident participant in your studies may not just be declining to seek help. They may be miscategorising the trust they're extending — believing they're in answer-trust territory ("I can check this") when their actual capacity to evaluate puts them in procedural or fiduciary territory.
The expertise asymmetry doesn't just change behaviour. It changes the nature of the reliance without the user knowing it's changed. That's where the institutional gap bites hardest — the system has no way to signal "you think you're checking my work, but you're actually depending on my judgment." Worth pursuing.
Thinking also about how it applies to Reciprocal Inquiry, the trust operates editorially (scope, angle), substantively (tone, organisation, engagement) and epistemically (research, cross-checks, interpretations) — but that's only because the framework proves itself. We're in the position of being able to cross-check judgment because the process enables that and we keep updating and maintaining it. You can't get that out of the box and most users probably can't prompt-craft it, but you can engineer it to tolerance.
Thank you for the restack, Matt, and the generous engagement with the reframe.